We look for evidence that heterogeneity of goods influences how the goods are traded internationally, whether via an intermediary in the form of a wholesaler, within the firm via intra firm trade, or at arms-length between firms. Making use of a unique data set of U.S. industries we find that trade among wholesalers is associated with homogenous goods, whereas intra-firm trade is associated with heterogeneous goods. These results are robust with respect to several different estimation methods.
Introduction
There has been a growing field of research recently on firm heterogeneity and intermediaries in international trade. Intermediaries are known to contribute a significant amount to total trade. From 2005 to 2007, intermediaries accounted for 41% of Chilean imports (Blum et. al., 2010) . Wal-Mart alone accounts for 15% of consumer good exports from China to the U.S. (Basker and Van, 2008) . In 2005, 22% of Chinese exports were by intermediaries; which is likely an underestimate due to misidentifying intermediaries based on firm name and licensing agreements before China's entry into the WTO (Ahn et. al., 2011) . Also in 2005 17% of all Turkish exports were traded by an intermediary (Abel-Koch, 2011) . Bernard et al. (2010a) finds that pure intermediaries (wholesalers and retailers) accounted for 9% of U.S. exports by value.
With respect to trade intermediaries, Bernard et al. (2010a) finds significant heterogeneity amongst exporters with respect to firm employment, volume/value of trade, and number of countries they export to. They find that firms that engage solely in wholesale or retail trade have lower employment than those that engage in no wholesale or retail trade. These firms trade less value but more products per country. Firms that engage in a mixture of wholesale/retail and direct trade have substantially higher employment than firms that only trade directly.
There has also been much research exploring why exporters use trade intermediaries. Ahn et al. (2011) and Akerman (2011) provide similar theoretical frameworks that find firms sort according to their productivity, and in general the least productive firms serve only the domestic market (or exit), the most productive export directly to the foreign market and all others use trade intermediaries. The intermediary provides lower fixed costs to access the foreign market than doing so directly, but has higher variable costs since the intermediary is providing a service. Thus firms that aren't productive enough to incur the larger fixed costs and trade directly use an intermediary to export. Ahn et al. (2011) uses Chinese census data at the firm level to empirically support the productivity sorting hypothesis. Intermediary unit values are also found to be higher than direct export values, consistent with model predictions that intermediaries have higher marginal costs.
With respect to country characteristics, Bernard et al. (2010b) and Ahn et al. (2011) both suggest that intermediaries are focused geographically. This is consistent with intermediaries possessing country specific knowledge that allows them to forego some costs of trade. Consistent with standard gravity model results, Bernard et al. (2010b) finds that exports are negatively related to distance and positively related to GDP. Ahn et al. (2011) finds that intermediary export share is positively related to distance and negatively related to GDP 2 . Intuitively, since exports in general decrease with distance, this makes intermediaries even more valuable for trade as distance increases. They also find that when compared to direct exports, intermediaries are less sensitive to country characteristics.
There has also been recent research examining the role related party, or intra-firm, trade plays. Felbermayr and Jung (2009) get similar results as Ahn et al. (2011) and Akerman (2011) when firms sort according to their comparative advantage, which is a measure of firm level productivity that is a function of the firms brand reputation, labor input requirement to produce one unit, and variable distribution costs. In their model, firms can trade via a foreign intermediary or a wholesale affiliate of the firm. They find firms with higher quality products, lower costs, and stronger marketability tends to use intra-firm trade. This is for two reasons; first intra-firm trade eliminates hold-up problems that can arise when trading with other firms, and second contracts between trading firms can raise costs for the exporter. Helpman et al. (2004) get similar results with respect to sorting by productivity, and their model predicts the most productive firms will invest in horizontal FDI to serve the foreign market. Bernard et al. (2010c) uses product and country characteristics to analyze firm decisions to import from related parties versus directly, or arm's length trade. Their motivation for using these characteristics is the large amount of observed heterogeneity amongst importers and contracting issues that can arise between importers and exporters.
Of particular interest to this paper, they find that industries whose products require greater capital and skill intensity are more positively associated with intra-firm trade.
Rauch (1999) finds evidence using a gravity model that product differentiation has an effect on international trade. He groups commodities into one of three categories based on how the commodity is priced. Commodities that are priced on organized exchanges, for example the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, are considered to be homogenous commodities because they can be priced without knowledge of the specific producer. Commodities that are priced in trade journals are considered referenced priced and also homogenous for the same reason as commodities priced on organized exchanges. All other commodities are considered differentiated for their lack of any widely accepted price. This research will use these commodity classifications to better understand how product differentiation influences firm's decisions to use intermediaries in international trade. While previous research has focused on firm and country characteristics of intermediary and direct exporters, this paper will focus on the products produced by the firm. In particular, we look for evidence that firms select their mode of export in part due to the products they trade.
Theoretical Framework
The previous research has focused on the relationships between arm's-length, wholesale, and related party trade while considering only two of these methods of trade in one model. This model wishes to combine all three of these methods of trade into one theoretical framework. To do so we will draw heavily upon the works of Ahn et al. (2011 ), Akerman (2011 ), Felbermayr and Jung (2009 ), and Helpman et al. (2004 essentially by simply synthesizing their frameworks. Ahn et al. (2011) The model by Helpman et al. (2004) contains trade via arm's length which has lower sunk costs than trade via related party, f AL < f RP , but higher per-unit costs that results in a flatter profit function. The switch from arm's length to related party trade at point B is based on the productivity of the firm, i.e., the most productive invest in a subsidiary with FDI. Labor per unit output is represented by the function h(·). This is shown graphically in figure 2.
In Felbermayr and Jung (2009) wholesale trade has lower fixed costs than related party trade. The switch from wholesale to related party trade at point C is related to the firm's competitive advantage which is a function in part of production costs and the marketability of its goods, i(·). This is summarized in figure 3 .
Figures 1 and 2 make it easy to see the relationship between costs,
This relationship is also captured in figure 3 . Figures 1-3 also provide simple visual evidence that
These relationships are summarized in figure 4.
Figure 4
We now see the richness available by including all three trading methods in a single theoretical framework. We are no longer binding firms to progress solely from one method to another, but rather a firm may begin with a wholesaler, than proceed to arm'slength, and finally related party trade. Intuitively this makes sense. A firm that is testing the waters of international trade for the first time is less likely to risk a large investment for an endeavor it is uncertain of. Wholesalers provide the cheapest way to this since they already have facilities abroad. They are also the easiest way, since they overcome country characteristics such as language, cultural, and legal barriers that can hinder trade. Once the firm has successfully traded and found a market receptive to their products moving to arm's length trade is now easier. The firm knows there is a market for their product making the added expenses of arm's length trade worthwhile to save the marginal cost
paid to wholesalers that flattens the profit curve. The argument for a move to related party from arm's length trade is similar.
Let us now turn out attention to j(·), the function that will determine the slope and intercept of the profit curves, and hence the level of wholesale, arm's-length, and related party trade. In line with previous research, j(·) should be a function capturing firm productivity, the firm's ability to write contracts for traded goods, and the quality or uniqueness of the firm's goods. Since the goods a firm produces has not often been the center of attention for previous research, let's discuss this in greater detail. Goods characteristics are important because they are how the firm earns profits. A unique good, a heterogeneous good, is likely to be more profitable than common goods, or homogenous goods. Apple Inc. makes very unique products and is indeed very profitable.
Compare this with the producers of oranges, which are quite homogenous, and less To inspect the data set, two subsets are created. Table 3 , column (1) represents industries where wholesale intensity is greater than related party intensity, and column (2) represents the opposite. We also conduct a difference of means test between these two columns to determine statistical significance. We observe that wholesale intense industries have mean employment significantly less than that of related party intense industries. There is not a statistically significant difference between the competiveness of wholesale or related party intense industries. Mean pay per worker is approximately 28%
higher in related party intense industries when compared to wholesale intense industries.
Pay per worker is likely to be closely related to employment size for an industry, and in these data we calculate a correlation coefficient of .43 between these two variables, which indicates a mild correlation. Related party intense industries also have significantly higher R&D to sales ratio. Industries that have more related party trade than wholesale trade also have a significantly larger portion of their products that are priced differentially. On average, approximately 82% of industries where related party trade is greater than wholesale trade have goods that are priced differentially, compared to 50% for wholesale intense industries. A similar observation is made when considering referenced price goods. Approximately 39% of wholesale intense industries goods are referenced priced compared to 15% for related party intense industries. Thus, one inference to make from these summary statistics is that the more homogenous the good, the more likely it is to be traded by wholesalers. Equivalently, the more heterogeneous the good the more likely it is to be traded by related party exchange.
Given the above observation, why may firms choose between wholesale or related party trade based on the good they're producing? Let's first consider how the production process may differ between the two types of goods. The production of a differentiated good may require more intermediate steps that are unique (and possibly secretive) to the firm. Thus by trading within the firm, they can take advantage of costs savings in the production process across countries to complete the final good.
A good example may be the automotive industry, which is considered to produce a differentiated good and thus heterogeneous. For instance, U.S. high skilled labor and technology may be used to produce component parts that are then shipped to affiliate plants in Mexico which has a lower labor cost to assemble the final product. Trading intra-firm or wholesale is beneficial because of the labor cost savings. However, intrafirm may be preferred because a firm possesses a unique assembly process for a differentiated product, and trading via a wholesaler would not be efficient (since the wholesaler is unlikely to know this process) or expose the firm's process to its competitors, thus losing its advantage. Indeed, in 2000 more than 70% of U.S. auto and related equipment imports are intra-firm trade (Bernard et al, 2010c) .
Compare this example with dairy product manufacturing, which is a referenced price good and thus homogenous. The production of dairy products is relatively well documented and similar amongst the various producers. Thus, if cost savings are available by trading during the production process, intra-firm and wholesale will both be beneficial. But wholesale may be preferred, because the production process is better known amongst firms and there are less production secrets that could be exposed. The lower fixed costs of trade offered by the wholesaler likely benefit the producers of homogenous goods, whereas the producers of differentiated goods are benefited by keeping the production process within the firm. Not surprisingly, our data reveals dairy product manufacturing is the industry with the largest percentage of its trade attributed to wholesale trade, approximately 60%. Agriculture in general should be expected to be dominated by wholesale trade, and consistent with findings from Bernard et al. (2010c) we find that out of the six most wholesale intense industries, five are agriculture related.
Shifting focus from the production of the good, let's now consider the level of control a firm may wish to have over their final good, how this level of control can influence their revenues, and the decision to trade via an intermediary, intra-firm, or directly. Let's first consider another heterogeneous good, for example a semiconductor, which is also a leading U.S. export. The firm, by either trading directly or intra-firm, retains control of the good throughout the entire trade process, and thus collects all the revenue from the final sale of the good. This is important because international trade by its nature segments consumers into different geographical locations. If the firm is able to apply third degree price discrimination, which is more likely for heterogeneous than homogenous goods, it can extract larger revenues. For instance, if Japanese consumers are willing to pay twice as much for a semiconductor than Mexican consumers, the firm can take advantage of this by intra-firm or direct trade. However, if the firm trades via an intermediary it loses this pricing control, reducing its revenue and possibly exposing its product to arbitrage. With intermediaries now controlling the final good, Mexican wholesalers could trade semiconductors with Japanese purchasers taking advantage of the price differences. This effect is likely less important for homogenous goods since arbitrage and price discrimination are more difficult. For semiconductors in our data we observe approximately 78% of total trade value is intra-firm or direct, whereas only 22% is traded via intermediaries. Difference of means test is conducted for columns (1) and (2). * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
We also divide the data set into two groups using a cutoff chosen for wholesale intensity such that the two groups are more similar in size. The results are shown in table   4 and a difference of means test is conducted as before. Difference of means test is conducted for columns (1) and (2). * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Estimation Methods
To determine the relationship between trading intensities (wholesale, related party, and arms-length), industry characteristics such as employment level, market concentration, pay per worker, and goods characteristics the following three equations will be estimated using different methods 6 :
where is the wholesale intensity for industry i, is the related party intensity, − ℎ is the arms-length intensity, is the conservative Rauch variable for differentiated prices, is the conservative Rauch variable for referenced prices, and is an error term. We estimate the model using different methods and find that our results are robust with respect to model specification. Aside from ordinary least squares estimation, we also estimate the model using logit, generalized linear model, and seemingly unrelated regressions.
Since our dependent variables are proportion data, and thus between zero and one, OLS may be too simple for our estimation purposes. Thus, we'll apply a logit transformation to the independent variables mapping their interval of zero to one to the real line. First we assume a model of the following form:
and applying simple algebra we have:
The logit model above has particular limitations, and thus a generalized linear model as suggested by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) will also be estimated 7 . We estimate a model of the form:
where ( * ) is the link function, and chosen such that 0 < ( ) < 1 ∀ ∈ ℝ. A natural choice for the link function is the logistic function, and is commonly used. Doing so will guarantee that the predicted values are in the interval zero to one (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996) .
We also estimate our model using seeming unrelated regressions (SUR). Under SUR, each regression can be estimated individually using OLS as was done earlier. But, unlike OLS, SUR assumes that the error terms are correlated, and this is likely true given the nature of our data. Indeed, upon inspection of the residuals from the earlier OLS equations we find the residuals between related party and arms-length trade regressions is 7 See page 620 of Papke and Wooldridge (1996) for a detailed explanation of these limitations.
highly correlated (-.76) , and between wholesale and arms-length trade (-.59) 8 . SUR is equivalent to OLS under two circumstances: when the error terms are uncorrelated and when each regression equation contains the same set of explanatory variables. Thus, product variables will be omitted when they are not hypothesized to have a significant effect.
Regression Results
All of the estimation methods produce similar results with respect to coefficient signs, magnitudes and significance levels. We find evidence that industries that are wholesale intense have lower employment on average. The coefficient for the natural log of mean employment is negative for wholesale and related party intensity, but larger in magnitude for wholesale intensity. The coefficient is positive for arms-length intensity.
This is consistent with previous research that wholesalers tend to have lower employment than other firms. The coefficients on Herfindahl-Hirschman Index are positive for wholesale and related party intensity, and negative for arms-length intensity. The coefficients are very small in magnitude and any inference may be an exaggeration of the true effect. The natural log of pay per worker is negative for wholesale and arms-length intensity, and positive for related party intensity 9 . This suggests that industries with a higher proportion of related party trade also have higher pay per worker. However, none of the coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level. We find evidence that the ratio of R&D to sales is positively related with wholesale and related party intensity, and negatively related with arms-length intensity. This relationship is statistically significant for related party and arms-length intensity. This suggests that related party trade is associated with higher R&D per sales, and the opposite for arms-length trade.
We find wholesale and arms-length trading intensities to be negatively related to differentiated goods, and related-party trade to be positively related. The relationship is statistically significant only with related party trade. This is evidence of one of the key hypotheses; goods that are heterogeneous are more likely to be traded within the firm rather than through a wholesaler.
The coefficient for referenced price goods is positive for wholesale and related party intensity, and negative for arms-length intensity. The coefficient is larger in magnitude for wholesale intensity than related party intensity and statistically significant for wholesale intensity in two of the four estimation methods. This is further evidence that goods influence the method of trade; in this case homogenous goods are associated with wholesale trade.
goods, thus intra firm trade is a safer way to protect this property. Heterogeneous goods may also be more profitable, and these profits may allow the firm to invest abroad to make intra firm trade possible and thus lower costs. Referenced goods, which are homogenous in nature, are associated with wholesale trade. The benefits of passing a homogenous good through a wholesaler, whom has country specific knowledge and provides market access, likely out way the costs using the wholesaler. 57% of the average industry in our sample is comprised of arms-length trade, trade that is not within the firm or using a wholesaler. Arms-length trade is negatively associated with differentiated and referenced goods, although this relationship is only statistically significant for referenced goods. 
